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China's Renewable Energy Policy: From Project-based to Strategic Policy Making:
Cases of Wind and Solar
Veronica Pei-Fei Chang1, Hans Bruyninckx2
Abstract
China is challenged by the imbalance between rapid economic growth and lacking
environmental protection. Economic growth and increasingly intensive use of energy are
certainly the main causes of environmental degradation in China. However, the central state
tries to find a way out of the energy-environment dilemma. In 2005, the Chinese president
Hu Jin-Tao emphasized that renewable energy was “an indispensable measure to deal with
the increasingly serious issues of energy and environment”. The following year, China's
Renewable Energy Law took effect, indicating a turning point in the energy policy.
This paper investigates China’s wind and solar energy, because they both reflect
proactive policies and major changes in China’s energy policy. We will discuss the
trajectories that are leading from a past policy which was based on more ad hoc and projects,
to an increased institutionalization of renewable energy as a strategic choice in China’s
energy mix.
Introduction
Since the 1979 economic reform, China went through a major shift in its system of
production and consumption.3 Industrial production has boomed, making China the ‘factory
of the world’. Improved living standards in urban areas have created a large middle class of
urban consumers. This fundamental shift requires massive amounts of (new) energy. China’s
reliance on mainly coal and to a lesser extend oil to meet its energy demand, explains why the
country has recently surpassed the US as the biggest carbon dioxide (CO2) emitter, and thus
the largest contributor to global warming in the world. 4 The international community is
calling on China (and other rapidly expanding economies such as India, Brazil, Mexico, …)
to take up responsibility by committing to energy efficiency and CO2 reduction targets under
the successor agreement of Kyoto, which will be negotiated in Copenhagen in December
2009. The Chinese national policy is responding by promoting renewable energy, including
wind and solar, which will be our focus in this paper.
We will first briefly discuss China’s increasing energy demand. The paper then maps
out the evolution of both wind and solar energy policies, with an emphasis on the driving
factors for change. We conclude with a comparison of both policy reforms. The paper
focuses on internal driving forces of both wind and solar policies and less on external factors.
China’s Increased Energy Demand and Problematic Energy Supply
The root causes of China’s spectacular increase in energy use, leading to a heavy reliance on
coal and oil, are economic expansion, urbanization and increased domestic consumption of
consumer goods and energy. Since the 1979 economic reforms, China’s GDP has increased
by about a factor 5, with another quadrupling predicted by 2050. Ever since the mid-1990s
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China has seen an average growth of 10% in GDP annually. In 1999 the World Bank
categorized China from ‘low income’ to ‘lower middle-income’ country, which indicated
great economic progress. According to the International Energy Outlook the GDP of China is
indeed growing by about 9.6% per year, yet energy and electricity demand is reaching 11%
and 15% annual growth rates respectively. This means that at this moment economic growth
is accompanied by increased energy intensity of the production apparatus.5
While most attention has been given to China’s role as a major export country to
explain its economic growth and the spectacular increase in energy demand, internal shifts in
urbanization and consumption are also of importance. China’s urban population has increased
in a unprecedented fashion to about 600 million urban citizens. While many of them are still
living in poor conditions (compared to the Western world), a domestic middle class,
possessing improved purchasing power has emerged. Several hundred million Chinese
urbanites today have moved beyond the basic needs.6 Their urban life style is based on the
consumption of modern goods and services, the ownership of private cars, larger housing
accommodation, etc. The result is a much increased use of energy for domestic purposes.
Coal is the main energy supply for economic growth in China. About 70% of the
domestic energy mix consists of coal.7 The low cost and domestic availability of coal are the
main reasons for its wide use by industrial sectors for steam and direct heat. It is also the key
source for electricity production. In addition, the consumption of coal is estimated to increase
with another 13% to 18% in the next 20 years.8 The other 30% of China’s energy mix consist
of oil 24%; natural gas, 3%; hydro, 2%; and, nuclear, 1%.9 The relative part of oil, which is
mainly used for transport and for derivates used in the chemical industry and agriculture, is
expected to increase, which means a serious increase in oil imports. China’s consumption of
oil is bigger than its oil production and the gap is widening.10 China is now the second largest
oil consumer in the world next to the US, and oil use will increase by 80% by 2020 if current
trends persist. China’s increased dependence on foreign oil has been discussed in many fora
in the last couple of years. It is putting extra stress on oil markets and reason for geo-political
concerns in sensitive regions such as Central Asia, the Middle East and Africa. In addition,
China’s strategy for foreign supply of oil (e.g. relations with Sudan and Nigeria) is not met
with great enthusiasm in the international community. It estimated that by 2020 China would
import 80% of its oil and that by 2025 the amount would reach over 14 million barrels per
day.11 Given the size of the country and the economy, China has thus become a major player
on global oil markets, next to the US.
It is fair to say that energy supply is considered as a, if not the, key challenge for
China’s sustained economic growth. In a country where further economic development
domestically includes getting large masses of people out of poverty, this is not considered a
luxury problem, but an essential element of national social development. Until now the
increased supply has come from the rapid and massive building of more coal centrals,
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imports of oil and increased use of gas. In addition, China has the most elaborate national
program for the building of new nuclear power plants.12
Besides direct economic consequences on the supply and demand side of the energy
market, the current dependence on fossil fuels also has significant and increasingly serious
environmental and health consequences. Firstly, heavy reliance on coal is a major cause of air
pollution in China.13 Burning coal releases sulfur, which causes acid rain-which has affected
30% of land areas nationwide- and contributes to global atmospheric pollution. . Secondly,
the use of coal is the major cause of CO2 emissions, making China a major contributor to
GHG emissions. China’s per capita emissions were still low 10 years ago; however, they
have increased so much that something needs to be done, especially in (the southeast)
industrial and urban regions. Thirdly, scholars have pointed out that fact that serious air
pollution is leading to deterioration of public health.14
China’s Response: Renewable Energy (RE)
Given the challenge of energy supply, and the consequences of inefficient energy use, the
Chinese authorities have also begun to develop a national policy on alternative energy
sources. These include the increased use of natural gas, hydro electricity and nuclear energy.
However, all of those have their own problems: natural gas is largely dependent on import
and is still carbon based, and in addition has already led to security debates due to tensions
with western minority tribes; hydro projects remain controversial and difficult to realize (cf.
Three Gorges Dam); and, nuclear energy also remains controversial, although China is
probably developing the most ambitious expansive policy trajectory for the moment. 15, Given
these circumstances, China has decided that a significant evolution in the direction of RE is
necessary to secure future energy supply and to deal with problems of pollution and global
warming.
China’s RE demand is expected to grow rapidly in the coming decades. 16 The
capacity of wind and solar up to 2005 was 760 MW and 60 MW respectively. 17 As the
government is aiming for 15% consumption of renewable electricity in 2020, capacity is
expected to reach 30,000 MW of wind farms and 1,000 MW of solar power.18 This will result
in a huge market for renewable energy. In the following paragraphs we provide a short
overview of those energy sources which are considered to be renewable by the Chinese
government, namely (small) hydro, biomass, wind and solar.
(Small) Hydro
The 2006 Renewable Energy Law (cf. below) defines small hydro power as renewable. Also,
the Ministry of Water Resources is advocating clean energy production by conducting
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projects on small hydro power plants. 19 Apart from the controversial Three Gorges dam,
other hydro-electricity operations are under way. There are 25 hydro power plant projects in
the Yellow River basin; they will provide 15800 MW. Four hundred small hydro plants have
already been established in rural areas and hold an installed capacity of 79000 MW. 20
Although hydro-electricity is recognized as a form of renewable energy, critical issues
remain, as environmental and social externalities are often rather important21: local wildlife
habitat or historic heritage destruction; relocation of inhabitants; loss of cropland; etc. 22
Despite the favourable legal recognition, there is a lack of mature policy for promotion, such
as uncertain price mechanisms and subsidies, low integration between the national grid and
(local) producers, etc.23
Biomass
From a policy perspective, there seems to be no concrete policy for the large-scale use of
biomass as an energy source at this stage.24 In 2008, China’s biomass capacity reached 2GW.
However, due to food security concerns, the Chinese government does not encourage
biomass use and has limited consumption.25 A general fear is that the use of biomass may be
in competition with increased demands for agricultural crops and thus leading to competition
over land as a scarce resource and high food prices, thus affecting food economics. The poor
would suffer the most form this evolution, as they will have more difficulties to afford highpriced crops. The possible growing gap between rich and poor may lead to other problems,
such as social tension or rural-to-urban migration for better employment.26
Wind and solar
In comparison to the above mentioned energy resources, wind and solar energy have major
advantages. They share the following similarities. First, both are clean energy sources
because they do not lead to serious pollution problems. They can help reduce CO2 emissions,
harm to public health, and contribute to keep development and environment in balance.27
Second, China can increase self-dependency by exploring wind and solar energy, thus
reducing reliance on foreign imports. 28 Third, developing both energies does not require
large-scale resettlements as is the case for hydro and natural gas.
China has very good conditions for developing wind and solar energy. Many of
China’s largest cities are located close to coastal areas, where it is possible to establish off19
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shore wind farms.29 The potential for additional wind power development in China is high
compared to the installed capacity. 30 Regarding solar resources, China’s rich solar power
reserve almost meets the amount of the US and exceeds the amount in Europe and Japan. The
current installed capacity equals the power supply of nearly 30 large scale coal power stations
and remains rather limited. 31 Solar power development has the potential to increase; the
resources are distributed around the north-west areas where they have big advantage for
setting up large scale photovoltaic (PV) power station, because of huge availability of space
in combination with abundant sunshine (more than 2000hrs annually).32 Experts recommend
further development of large PV power plants in the future.33
China’s Wind Energy Policy: From Projects to Strategic Policy
The Chinese government policy on wind energy is like ‘crossing a river by feeling rocks’,
which indicates that trial and errors are an integral part of its development as a new energy
source.34 To provide systematic understanding we divide China’s wind policy development
into several stages35; this helps finding factors influencing wind policy changes. In general
we notice two evolutions: one is from ad hoc or project based policy to strategic policy
making, the other is the shift from fragmentation towards coordination.36 Both evolutions are
interrelated.37
The Early Stages (1986-1993)
In the 1980s, the State Council issued “Several Recommendations on Promoting the
Development of Rural Energy,” which emphasized the development of RE, including wind
energy technology to meet rural energy demands. China has developed wind energy since
1985, in a steady yet slow fashion. 38 This was partly due to the lack of a stable market
environment nor funding available. 39 Overall, the energy policy focused on the centrally
29
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planned electricity sector, with the Ministry of Electric Power (MOEP) as the main
institutional actor, and coal and oil as the major sources for electricity production.40
Wind energy was first mentioned in the 7th five-year plan (1986-1990), which began
grid connected wind energy development. The early stage of development was mostly
supported by foreign government loans and imports.41 For example, 55 Kw wind turbines
produced by the Danish producer Vestas were installed in the Rongsheng Province.42 In the
past, private investors were not allowed to participate in energy sectors; it was not until 1987
that the monopoly was abolished. 43 From then on, sub-national government, state-owned
enterprises (SOE), and even foreign companies were allowed to build and own power
producing facilities.44 .
However, challenges remained in private investments.45 Firstly, there was no market
incentive, because the Kwh prices for wind energy were twice as high as those of coal, which
was largely subsidized by the government. Secondly, there was lack of knowledge about the
local use of grid-connected turbines. Thus, investors were not sure whether electricity could
be sold in secured amount. Thirdly, regarding the bureaucratic structure; there was no
specific bureaucracy solely responsible for promoting RE. Given the central role of state
institutions in China, this was a serious problem.
The 8th five-year plan (1991-1995) saw progress in research and development on RE.
For example, in the early 90s, the Chinese Academy of Meteorological Science conducted the
first investigation on wind resources nationwide. It concluded that China had a potential of
253 GW.46 In fact, this evaluation suggested that the total electricity output could be more
than the total electricity capacity installed in traditional energy at that time. 47 Yet, wind
development was slow during the 1986-1993 period with an installed capacity of less than 15
MW in 1993. 48 The focus on basic conditions or wind potential could not conceal
insufficient technology, a weak and fragmented bureaucracy and a reliance on imports of
turbines. This resulted in a small role for wind energy in the national energy strategy. 49
Whatever wind energy existed in this period was planned in a rather ad hoc fashion and not
part of a national strategic policy choice in the direction of RE.
However, this period also signifies the start of new ideas about finding solutions to
the energy supply problems. Chinese high level policy-makers became aware that coal had a
devastating impact on the environment and human health during the 1990s. By the early
1990s China had also become a party to international agreements such as the Montreal and
the Kyoto Protocols, which urged China to collect data and establish coordinating
institutions, which contributed to the later development of more strategic environmental and
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energy policies (including RE policy).50 China also took advantage to ask for funding from
international organizations such as the World Bank (WB), the Asian Development Bank
(ADB), the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP), as well as technology transfer
from Japan and the US. Because of international cooperation and exposure to international
experiences, Chinese planning commissions learned the importance of RE policy alternatives
and gradually accumulated know-how to formulate an energy strategy which incorporated
RE.51
From Projects to Programs (1994-1999): First Cohesive Wind Energy Policy in 1994:
In 1994, the “Recommendations on the Construction and Management of Wind Farms” were
issued to establish a firm foundation for wind power in China. The first cohesive wind energy
policy was also proposed in the same year by the Ministry of Electric Power (MOEP) entitled
“Strategic Development Plan for Generation of Wind Energy in China 2000- 2020”. The
policy aimed to reach 1000MW installed capacity by 2000, through instruments such as
Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) and a fixed tariff. PPA means investors had assurance
that the government would buy all electricity at a fixed price.52 The fixed tariff refers to the
government buying electricity from investors at a fixed price, plus an additional 15% profit to
make sure investors would not lose money and to reduce investment risks. 53 This policy was
“enormously helpful in promoting wind power development in China”54 as installed capacity
soared annually with an average of 43MW per year from 1995 to 1998; a big progress
compared to 1.6 MW annual growth in previous years.55
Several large(r)-scale programs contributed to the early growth of wind energy in
China. In 1996, the State Development and Planning Commission (SDPC) allocated one
billion Yuan to launch the ‘Ride the Wind (chengfeng) Program’, which was an industry
oriented policy approach. It intended to boost local technology development and production
capacity, by stating that 60 to 80% of the wind turbines should be domestically produced,
through joint ventures or international cooperation, hoping to achieve 400 MW installed
capacity by 2010.56 One thing that deserves attention was that the goal of development was
reduced from 1000 MW to 300-400MW, because policy makers were aware of the failure to
achieve previous targets because of their unrealistic nature.57 The Chinese government later
offered higher grid-connection tariffs for renewable energy, attracting more foreign and
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domestic market entry. 58 Two implementation challenges can be identified. Firstly, tax
reduction inequality. Even though the import tax on turbines was reduced from 12% to tax
exemption; tax for critical components (such as bearings) remained rather high, thus
frustrated investors and led to resistance.59 Secondly, although the Guangzhou Institute of
Energy Conversion confirmed that China had ‘mastered’ the production of key components
of wind generators, 60 in practice, Chinese turbines were of poor quality and not durable
enough. The overall result was not satisfactory, with lots of money invested in poor
operational reliability.61 These problems and challenges led to wind projects being cancelled,
and previous targets not being met.62
During the same time period The State Planning Commission (SPC) proposed another
strategy in the “Program for Development of New and Renewable Energy Sources in China:
1996-2010”; it was under supervision of the SPC, the State Economic and Trade Commission
(SETC) and the State Science and Technology Commission (SSTC)63 In 1999, the Chinese
government issued relevant policy recommendations to remove operational barriers to
renewable energy development. 64 One major obstacle was still the cost of wind turbine
installations, including high prices for imported equipment, high transaction costs, and local
services expenses. A number of implementation problems hampered the program. First, there
was no strong legal status for PPA. Private investors produced electricity at a higher price
than coal plants, and saw themselves facing local distributors (under local governments), who
refused to buy wind electricity at a high price, which was a violation of PPA agreements. The
lack of enforcement, let alone penalties to force local distributors to purchase the electricity at
a higher price led to investment loss.65 Secondly, poor coordination existed between higher
level energy authorities. There were three major authorities in charge of renewable energy
technology and equipment production:66 The SPC approved large-scale projects and local
manufacturing. The SETC was responsible for domestic enterprises and technology
development; the SSTC for R&D and technology transfer from abroad. However, there was
no clearly defined division of labor among the three authorities. Rather, there was a power
struggle between them to fight for control and funding, which led to lack of coordination and
fragmented authority, and in the end negative impact on the development of the wind energy
sector. 67 Third, with wind energy producers and distributors in reality under the same
government unit, or under the system of state monopoly over the electricity sector (also
typical, by the way, for European countries before the liberalization of the electricity
58
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markets), relevant regulations were likely to be ignored.68 The 1997 reform, for example,
established the China State Power Corporation (CSPC), which was defined as an SOE to
increase transparency and create an investor-friendly environment. The problem was that the
CSPC was in charge of both transmission and generation of electricity; because of costsaving concerns, the CSPC tended to opt for coal-fired electricity, yet there was no authority
to force it to increase wind energy production.69
In conclusion, the 1994-1999 time period saw gradual progress of wind energy
development, based on a change from ad hoc installation to a more programmatic approach.
The installed capacity increased over ten times with over 200MW installed, compared to less
than 15 MW before.70 Through the Chengfeng Program which was targeting local industry
and market development, market actors were encouraged to participate. Yet, progress was
very slow. One of the reasons was a lack of domestic production capacity for wind turbines,
with 95-97% of the installed turbines being imported.71 In addition, implementation struggled
because of lack of legal sanctions against violation of the PPA principle, lack of coordination
and constant power struggles among government agencies. Such low state capacity and
fragmented structure fell short of coherent policy. Most of all, the key problem was the Kwh
price of wind remained higher than that of coal. As a consequence wind energy was not
considered a potential alternative at this stage.72.
Coordination Taking Shape (2000-2006): From Program to Strategic Policy Objective
The 2000-2006 period was marked by several important initiatives to reform the institutional,
economic and legal context of the wind energy sector. We will discuss them in the following
paragraphs.
A. Institutional Reform: The Establishment of the Energy Bureau (EB)
To improve coordination, which seems to be one of the major obstacles in effective
implementation in the energy sector from past experience, 73 the Chinese government
intervened by reforming the existing EB under the NDRC in 2005, as a unified institution for
policy administration and implementation. 74 In the past, the EB was under the State
Development and Reform Commission (SDRC), the former body of the National
Development and Reform Commission (NDRC)--China’s top economic planning body.75 The
EB was rather weak in coordinating the price system due to lack of authority and sufficient
resources.76 The reform of the EB was considered to be moving towards centralization and an
indicator of the central state intervention.
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The State Energy Office (SEO) was established also in 2005 mainly in charge of
policy-making. The office reports directly to the Energy Elite Group (or National Energy
Leadership Group), which consist of Premier Wen Jiabao, Vice Premiers Huang Ju and Zeng
Peiyan, high-level representatives from the SEPA (now Ministry of Environmental
Protection), as well as the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). This signified the importance
attributed to the issue of energy supply and energy security at the highest political level.77 In
short, the SEO and the EB were reorganized for different functions. The SEO was responsible
for policy-making; the EB for implementation. The reason for this separation of tasks, is to
avoid corruption. With 11 trillion Yuan (US$1.33 trillion) allocated to the energy sector, a
single unified agency would be exposed to accusations of corruption and conflicts of interest.
In addition, under the NDRC various institutes, among them the Energy Research
Institute, which includes the Renewable Energy Research Center operate in this field. The
center composes a group of research fellows, who are responsible for not only research and
advice to the central government but also participate in policy making, such as drafting the
Renewable Energy Law, as well as relevant policy and legal documents.78
B. Decentralization: Separate Power Production and Delivery
In order to stimulate effective implementation and to address the problem of having producer
and distributor being the same state actor, the government decentralized the CSPC by
separating power generation and transmission. 79 For example, power production was
decentralized into several SOEs: the Huaneng Group, the Huadian Corporation, the China
Datang Corporation, the Guodian Corporation, and the China Power Investment Group.
Transmission (grid companies) was decentralized into the State Grid Corporation of China
and the China Southern Power Grid Corporation.80
C. The Concession Program
The NDRC began issuing wind energy concessions in 2003 for government-selected sites
through a competitive bidding process for potential developers, aiming to lower wind energy
prices through competition. The overall purpose was to develop wind power at the lowest
cost possible, bring down high wind power tariffs, and reflect true prices through a bidding
process, yet retain control over developments.81 This implied that the government was trying
to move towards a large scale, market-driven development base, with less uncertainty and
more possibilities to strengthen the institutional capacity in wind energy.82
In order to be a legitimate bidder, projects had to be between 50-100 MW in size with
50% of the wind turbines locally manufactured (later 70% in 2005).83 A wind resource site is
chosen by the government before biddings, road access and grid connection are provided later
to winners. 84 The instruments used to combat high prices were the Renewable Portfolio
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Standard (RPS) for power producer and the PPA for power delivery. In China, RPS is labeled
as Mandatory Market Share (MMS), meaning a quota obligation to take up a certain
percentage of RE in power output.85 For example, large SOEs with projects of over 5 GW
total installed capacity, must include a 5% wind power share. PPA is a must buy system for
power grid companies to secure stable demand as mentioned earlier.86
Some scholars labeled it as “a government tendering system,” with the government
selecting wind developers based on low price and local content through a bidding process,
together with agreements to purchase power on fixed-terms. 87 Problematic in this system
could be underbidding and the use of low quality technology to cut the price. Quality
concerns also exist regarding this program. Bidding results shows that power developers are
mostly the five SOE from the 2000 reform. Foreign developers can hardly win bidding due to
high prices. Spanish and German developers, for example, tendered with prices 50-70%
higher than those of the SOE winning bidders.88 The price was decreased from average 0.75
Yuan/kWh to 0.373-0.519 Yuan/kWh in 2006.89 With price being the determining criterium,
those who offer the lowest price, yet poor quality could win the bidding. In case real output is
less than the promised or installed capacity or less than the mandatory RPS percentage, the
concession program does not seem to have a strong compliance or sanctioning mechanism. A
second issue concerns the feed-in tariff, which is considered essential by scholars. 90 The
concession program does not include a feed-in tariff. Instead, a project based PPA was used.
However, there seems to be no sanction against PPA violation. In addition, it appears difficult
to implement the PPA effectively, because of institutional uncertainty in the electric power
structure; this is confirmed by Ms. Ma Lingjuan, deputy executive director of China RE
entrepreneurs club, who said that the compulsory system of MMS and PPA are merely policy
mechanisms yet not often implemented in reality.91
In the end, it is important to recognize that the concession program did not completely
reduce the price disadvantage of wind power. Wind energy is still higher in price than fossil
fuel based electricity. Raufer and Wang believe that a supporting policy (such as price based
policy) is needed to complement the concession program.92
D. The Renewable Energy Law (REL)
By far the most influential step was the formulation of a REL at the highest legislative level.
In 2003, the Government began to formulate the “Promotion Law for Renewable Energy
Development and Utilization.” The goal of this law was to “confirm the role of renewable
energy in China’s national energy strategy, create a market base and remove barriers to
market development, as well as a social atmosphere conducive to renewable energy.”93 The
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Standing Committee of the National People's Congress (NPC) passed the Law on February
28, 2005 after which it became effective in 2006.94
It is a sort of framework law, which lays the foundation for the further development of
renewable energy production in China for decades to come. Politically it is the expression of
the commitment to make RE a strategic part of China’s overall energy policy and the
recognition that in order to fulfill future environmental and climate change targets and
commitments, RE production will have to be an essential part of the energy supply system.
The framework law indicates government willingness to develop renewable energy on a long
term basis: increasing the RE percentage in the total energy mix; help industrial and
technological development; focus on market development.95 Overall, a national MMS of 15%
RE of total gross energy production. The law requires a certain percentage of non-hydro
renewable power production: “Power generators with self-owned installed capacity of over 5
GW will be required to have a non-hydro renewable energy installed power capacity (selfowned) that accounts for 3 percent of their total capacity by 2010 and for over 8 percent of
their total self-owned capacity by 2020. (section 5 (1))”96. This indicates an approach to opt
for low carbon emission energy resources. During the period of 1994-1999 the PPA had no
legal ground, violators faced no sanctions. With the REL as a new legal basis, scholars
believe that the PPA in the concession model will work more effectively.97
Next to the REL, a system of RE policy making (development, strategy, guarantee
measures) including financial mechanisms (public cost sharing by citizens), etc., was
developed to make sure that the law would lead to the desired policy objectives.98 The NDRC
is responsible for detailed implementation (including authorization), with the EB representing
the central unified institution for coordination. According to some critical voices, it is still
necessary to establish an institution solely responsible for wind energy.99
E. The 70% Local Content Rule
Before 2005, the major challenge of wind power development was that most wind turbines
and generators relied mainly on foreign imports, which was expensive and thus investment
costs were high.100 To reduce the burden of investment, the Chinese government, especially
the National State Council, proposed a decision on July 4th 2005 that 70% of the wind
turbines should be produced locally.101 The intention was to stimulate technology transfer to
local wind turbine manufacturers and reduce production costs 102 A condition is that the
bidding company was to guarantee a collaboration with a wind generator/turbine producer,
who guarantees to provide 70% local made wind generators. 103 This rule is controversial
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under WTO regulation as it is considered a form of protectionism.104 This point is made by
other industries and wind energy activists, arguing that this requirement is higher than the
40% local content demand in the car sector. 105 Another issue is the quality of locally
produced turbines. Poor quality results in production losses (repair costs) which in turn leads
to investment loss.106 In an interview with Reuters, Shi Pengfei, the vice-president of the
China Wind Energy Association, believes that policy change is necessary to deal with poor
quality to prevent damage to the Chinese wind turbine manufacturers.107
The Maturing Period
All indicators point towards a further development of wind energy in China. Raufer R. and
Wang (2007) foresee that wind development will move towards larger scale projects,
probably from currently 50 MW to over 150 MW, with larger projects possibly promoted by
the central government.108 This tendency is confirmed by the Director of the Energy Research
Institute at the NDRC 109 The concession program will probably be expanded including risk
assessments of bidders. In addition, the role of the provincial governments will become more
important. Raufer R. and Wang (2007) further assume that green certificates (quantity-based
approach) will enter the process, to encourage mass production and help moving towards a
market-oriented system.110
All of these possibilities are contingent upon further policy development. Based on
the REL, new implementation specificities can be issued, including specific objectives for
wind energy development. A promising scenario envisioned by Raufer R. and Wang (2007)
is that a stable market for wind energy will come into existence. Wind turbine technology
will greatly progress; institutions promoting wind energy will be established. Green
certificate approaches will be operated and a market will be established for Renewable
Energy Credit (REC) to become trading commodities, which seems to be the ultimate goal
for wind energy development.111
Solar Energy Policy: Still The Underdog?
We will provide an analogous account of solar energy, meaning a historic approach with
attention for the main changes in the policies. When we say solar energy, we refer in first
instance to the use of PV cells. In China, the most well known use of solar power is probably
the solar water heater, but given the totally different nature of this application of solar energy,
we do not take this as an example of the type of policy choices and changes we are aiming to
understand. From the start it has to be clear that the solar sector is much less developed than
the wind energy sector at this moment. There are two key reasons for this. First, the
technology of solar energy is less advanced in terms of energy efficiency. Second, the price
of solar energy remains significantly higher than that of wind energy on the domestic market.
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This has created the peculiar following situation: China is by now the largest producer in the
world of PV panels, yet the overwhelming majority is exported to Europe and to a lesser
extend the US.
The Initial Period (1986-1993): Small Scale, Local Approach
From the 1950s to the 1970s China’s interest in solar energy was mainly driven by possible
applications in its space or satellite program. Terrestrial use of solar cells began in 1973, but
the PV market development was very slow.112 Solar energy was first mentioned in both the
6th and 7th five-year plans (1981-1985; 1986-1990) in which the government supported PV
use in rural areas (disconnected from the grid; local solution) and specific industries.
However, it seems that concrete projects on solar energy did not begin until the late 1990s.
Small PV Market (1994-1999): The Brightness Project
In September 1996, the World Solar Peak Conference in Zimbabwe proposed the Brightness
Program for regions suffering from power shortage; the Chinese government echoed the idea
and launched a national Brightness Project Implementation Plan in 1998. 113 The overall
objective was to provide sufficient electricity to 23 million people in remote regions by 2010,
including Tibet, Inner Mongolia, Gansu, and Xingjiang; the program aimed to favor lowincome households, and to provide 100 watt capacity per person.114 Given that many poor
households could not afford even the smallest investment to obtain the technology, the
government funded the program with around 36 billion Yuan. Once the program was
implemented it was to provide around 260000 Kwh of green electricity annually, reduce 15.4
tons of carbon dioxide, and 1991 tons of nitrogen emission.115 The first phase lasted for 5
years and aimed to provide power supply to 8 million people.
The advantage was that it supported poor households with access to electricity. After
the first stage, what was left to be done included using hybrid systems that consisted of both
wind generators and solar PV to provide further electricity in the Inner Mongolia, Tibet and
Gansu provinces116.
More Programmatic Focus on Rural Use ( 2000-2006)
In this period China further emphasized the rural use of solar energy. In the following
paragraphs we illustrate this approach by giving the most noteworthy examples.
A. Renewable Energy Development Project (REDP)
A representative case was the Renewable Energy Development Project (2001-2006) funded
by the WB and the Global Environment Facility (GEF).117 The aim was to provide power
with wind/PV hybrid systems to remote areas, such as Qinghai, Gansu, Inner Mongolia,
Xingjiang, Tibet, and Western Sichuan. Also to reduce the cost of PV systems and improve
their quality. Further, the program was supposed to support the development of PV market in
rural areas. 118 Apart from central government (NDRC) intervention, other actors such as
private enterprises, joint ventures, and SOEs were welcomed to participate. The project
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helped stimulate PV industry of China, especially in the module manufacturing aspect.119
According to the REDP management office, which is under the NDRC, there are now over 20
PV module producers with annual output of 100 MW, compared to only 7 PV module
producers in1997 with annual output of 2-3MW.120
B. Rural subsidies: Township Electrification Program (Song Dian Dao Xiang 2001-2005
Assistance from the REDP had influenced subsequent projects, one of them was the
Township Electrification Program. With assistance from the UNDP and GEF, the project was
lauded by the then State Development and Planning Commission (SDPC; former body of the
NDRC) and completed in 2005.121 Apart from foreign assistance, there was funding granted
by both central and local government around 3 billion Yuan altogether.122
Different from the REDP which focused on stimulating PV module production, the
Township Electrification Program concentrated on maintaining installed technology of PV
panels and establishing more PV power plants.123 The project provided solar electricity to 700
villages, about 300,000 households and one million people in western provinces. With a total
installed capacity of 15,537 KWH, the project was the world’s largest, using a combined
wind-solar power stations to provide electricity to rural area.124
The prospect of all these projects was overshadowed by the high production cost,
which remained a major obstacle in solar energy policy. The PV electricity price could not
be compared with that of coal, because the latter was mostly subsidized by the government.
The market price for PV products was still unstable.125 To save costs, producers were inclined
to use cheaper yet lower quality materials, resulting in a very short life expectancy of
products. The problem was revealed by local pilot project operations. Unless the government
established a pricing system for PV electricity production and linked cost with profits, the
market would not have further developed, so it was believed.126 Yet others were holding a
more optimistic view.127 Wang Wenjing, a solar energy expert at the Chinese Academy of
Sciences, assumed that solar subsidies were feasible in the next couple of years. "The lack of
government policy is constraining the use of solar energy…If the government would just
come out with a policy, I'm certain China could very quickly become the world's largest user
of solar energy.”128 This spelled out the policy challenge for the next period.
The 11th Five year plan (2006-2010) and beyond: a more strategic move forward?
The 11th Five Year Plan formulated the goal to provide 250 MW of PV electricity to 2 million
households, as well as 50 MW of rooftop through rooftop applications and 20 MW power
plants in the Gobi desert.129 This indicated the government’s continuous efforts in promoting
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solar energy and its move to a more strategic approach as RE was considered in 2006 to be a
central element of energy supply for the future, the fight against global warming and in
addition an instrument in the fight against air pollution. The priority remained on remote
areas with a further expansion of standalone technology and connections to the local grid in
the rural use. But not only rural areas are benefiting from policy initiatives. The Shanghai
100000 Solar PV Roof Plan (2006-2010) foresees to install 100,000 PV panels on roofs of
local buildings with an estimated total installed capacity of 400 MW.130
Currently, solar energy investors point out that a major challenge is the lack of
government for R&D for technological improvements. Consequently, production costs are
transferred to users, and high costs discourage the general public to install solar PV
systems.131 Market creation and further investments in technology might be stimulated by
government projects. More state institutions or SOE buildings will install PV panels as a way
to promote solar. If there is a strong government policy, the market could grow fast after
2010, with a downward pressure on the price per Kwh.132 As mention earlier, wind power
development is more mature than that of solar. Local government has autonomy to approve
wind projects under 50 MW, while solar projects remain centrally controlled. For example,
the NDRC has most influence to the industry.133
The REL
The REL provides guidelines for grid (art. 14; art.19; art. 20) and off-grid PV (art. 15; art. 22)
power systems.134 Two important approaches which influence the solar policy are the MMS
and cost-sharing (art.9; art. 12) systems, but in reality, these guidelines and approaches do not
seem to be effective.135 Firstly, the problem of high cost mentioned above remains the major
obstacle; the industry hopes that the problem can be reduced through bidding system. So far
(until 2009), there are only three projects operated through bidding system. Secondly, there
is lack of large-scale PV power development; no PV power systems are granted permission
from grid companies to be connected to the grid. 136 A recent project in Gansu province this
year seems to demonstrate possibility to combat the problems, thanks to the REL. It is by far
the largest solar project with 10 MW capacity, compared to previous two bidding projects in
Inner Mongolia of 205 kw and Shanghai Chongmingdao of 1MW. 137 The winner in the
Gansu project offers the lowest price of 0.69 Yuan/Kwh, which is probably the lowest price
ever so far; There is intense competition in the industry as most investors both home and
abroad are eyeing on this opportunity.138
More long term objectives (2020 and beyond) foresee the growth of the solar market
in grid-connected PV development and a further spreading of the technology, especially in
those areas with large solar potential. It is hoped that most villages in western provinces can
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have grid-connection by 2020. 139 According to the current policy development, the
accumulated installed capacity should reach to 10000 MW by 2020. 140
In conclusion of this part, we can state that the promotion of solar energy in China is
based on the fact that it is carbon dioxide free, and would add to the diversification of the
energy supply. In addition it is by definition a domestic resources, thus also contributing to a
lower dependence on foreign energy and energy security. Solar energy is now included in the
REL, five-year plans, mid-to-long term plans, which indicates that the Chinese government is
convinced more than ever of the prospect of solar energy and that there is a strong will to
develop it on a long term basis through policy programs. The downside is that the industry is
facing limited supply of raw materials for producing PV panels(such as polysilicon) and
materials to produce wafers, which does give it an aspect of foreign dependence.141
Comparing Wind and Solar Policy Changes
Both wind and solar energy are today being regarded as essential components of China’s
future energy policy. This is a long way from the ad hoc or project based approach at the
beginning of the 1980s and into the 1990s. Given the pressures of energy security,
environmental protection and climate change and in the context of a booming demand for
energy, China’s choice for RE is future oriented and in line with the overall national goal of
sustained and sustainable development as was formulated by the highest political and state
authorities on several occasions.
Both policies demonstrate a number of similarities in their policy development
(Table1). First, they have both followed the trajectory from project base, over program driven
and finally reached the strategic policy stage. They are both explicitly mentioned in the REL
and considered strategic energy sectors (next to hydro and nuclear power) as non-carbon
based energy sources. Second, we have witnessed an evolution towards a more coordinated
policy at the level of central state institutions. The NDRC is playing a crucial role in this as a
government agency with high authority and power in laying out China’s development path.
Third, although a more coordinated central approach is a sign of centralization, there is also a
move towards decentralization. Provinces, regions and cities have increased leverage in how
the renewable energy policy will be implemented. This form of decentralization is part of a
larger division of tasks between state institutions, with the central government providing
policy frameworks and local actors being more responsible for implementation, which takes
into account the more local context. Fourth, in both wind and solar energy the market is being
introduced as an organizing principle. Market actors, both SOEs and private domestic and
international companies have entered the energy production and distribution market because
of favourable legislation and a beneficial opportunity structure, created through different
instruments. This also means that the price per Kwh is becoming more important and
competition between RE and other energy sources has increased.
There are also a number of differences. First, at this moment the spreading of wind
energy is much more rapid as the technology is more mature, the price per Kwh more
competitive and the scale of installations more in line with a connection to the grid. Solar
remains expensive compared to wind. A second difference is that solar seems to have its
biggest application until now in rural and remote areas. Often non-grid connected and used as
a means to bring electricity to small communities or even individual households. Wind
energy is much more connected to the national grid. Third in terms of regulations, there are
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differences between wind and solar. Essentially wind energy works with tax incentives and
solar with a feed in tariff. Fourth, wind energy is slowly getting a domestic production
capacity (often in joint venture with West-European companies) based on the rule that
mandates 70% of the installations to be ‘made in China’. Solar energy is very different, with
China already being the largest producer of PV panels in the world. But, the production is
almost completely exported, mainly to Europe.
Table 1. Overview of solar and wind energy policies comparison.
Compiled based on sources from China Renewable Energy Industry Association (2007) China Solar PV
Report, China Environmental Science Press; NREL, UNEP

Policies
Feed-in tariffs
Direct subsidies
MMS/ RPS

Solar energy
Yes, but no fixed price
Project specific
Over 3% of non-hydro RE
output by 2020;
8% for power generators
over 50GW
PV/wind requirement in no
RPS
Green
certificates no
mechanism
Tax incentives
no
Local content
90-98% export oriented
Specific Institution for No
solar/wind
Structural reform needed
National policy targets
Low

Wind energy
no
Project specific
Over 3% of non-hydro RE
output by 2020;
8% for power generators
over 50GW
no
no
yes
70%
No
Structural reform needed
high

Conclusion
To answer the question “why does China’s (renewable) energy policy change”, this paper has
touched upon both internal and external factors. Internal factors are mainly economic growth,
consumerism, and urbanization all of which have rapidly increased the demand for energy.
China wants to be energy independent without relying on other countries. A major part of the
solution will be RE development because it contributes to sustainable economic development.
The soaring demand for energy use is driving China to seek diverse energy resources,
including clean energy like wind and solar. However, wind and solar energy developments
are fighting against the dominance of coal use, a source that is abundantly available and
relatively cheap.
External factors include the pressures on China regarding climate change policies and
thus CO2 emissions, the global competitions for scarce energy resources, and a set of
environmental problems related to the current energy system (coal based) but with
transboundary repercussions, such as SO2.
To answer the “how does China’s (renewable) energy policy change” question, the
paper concludes that internally, China has been focusing on development since the 80s, and
the 90s saw the dawn of renewable energy taken into account in policy strategies or outlines,
(ex. the Energy Conservation Law in 1997). The wind and solar policy evolutions and
changes demonstrate that the REL seems to be a major turning point from coal-based to RE
policy, incorporating environmental concern to institutional policy framework. Externally,
China’s increasing engagement in international organizations and activities is forcing the
country to conduct changes to adopt new principles (ex. sustainable development concept),
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approaches such as more participation of multi-national corporations (MNC), academics, less
central intervention, etc.
The paper has provided an overview to both wind and solar policies, and map out
influencing factors mainly from internal aspects. Further study can include external
influencing factors for comprehensive analysis. Another approach for further research is to
establish a conceptual-theoretical framework to analyze the changing role of the central state
and the influence of market actors’ participation (ex. private, SOEs and academics) in both
wind and solar policies.
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